Aught he has to know it with.

 

He spilled it after 35 seconds ... and then we waterboarded him 82 more times

With the recently released torture memos making it clear  just how many times we waterboarded Abu Zubaydah and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (83 and 183 respectively), my mind raced back to a vaguely recalled article from a couple years ago. In this article, there was a statistic about how quickly waterboarding had worked to loosen the terrorism suspect's tongue, and I remembered being simultaneously horrified and impressed with the speed at which it worked. A little digging, and I found the article.


An AP article that quoted a former CIA agent from December of '07, it was one of the first public confirmations that we had used waterboarding. Interesting, though, is the fact that the former agent claimed Abu Zubaydah was talking "in less than 35 seconds." We now know from the memos that that's at the long-end of a normal waterboarding session. So, if we can believe this agent, they used it once to great effect, and then used it 82 more times

So, one of two things is true. 
1. It was really effective the first time and we tortured him 82 more times anyway.
2. It wasn't effective, but we tried it 83 times. 
Which one nauseates you more?

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

Further explorations of CEO compensation

I was pointed to the data visualization website Verifiable by this blog post. I then came across a chart of total CEO compensation against stock performance, showing little correlation between performance and pay.

I snagged the data and made some changes. Since stock performance is highly variable, and CEOs probably don't have all that much control over one-year stock returns, I was curious to see if CEO compensation was related at all to the size of the company. After all, it's reasonable that boards of directors will consider the difficulty of CEO's job to increase as the company grows larger and its operations more complex, and so pay more to entice top talent. Market cap may not be the best proxy for size and complexity, but it's pretty good.

I excluded Apple, where Steve Jobs makes $1 a year, and took the log of both total compensation (including stock options and grants) and total cash compensation, and compared them with the log of market capitalization. As you can see, there does some to be a weak positive correlation in both charts. The correlation between total compensation and market cap is 0.36 and that drops to 0.33 between cash compensation and market cap.

So what have we learned? Not that much. There's probably an extensive academic literature on this subject that I haven't looked at. But this does suggest that CEO compensation isn't a total black box.


Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

Stanky banks

Go Citigroup! Best quarter since 2007! Thanks to an accounting trick and revenue from their fixed income trading unit. 


What is with these fixed income trading units? They made JP Morgan money, they helped Goldman sell $5 billion in stock. In fact, they seem to be single-handedly keeping their banks in the black. But what are they trading, and why is it they're making so much money now? 

kinnounko03.jpg

Seems that AIG, owned by you and me, is selling these banks entire portfolios of fixed income instruments at really, really low prices. This is what it means, apparently, to "unwind" AIG's business -- sell still-valuable assets to investment banks at well below their market value in portfolio-sized transactions. The investment banks make big profits, and the soon-to-be-unemployed managers of these trading desks at AIG are eminently employable heroes to the investment banks.

But how could this happen? Probably because the government wants it to happen. This is one sneaky, anti-capitalist, anti-markets, anti-democratic method of giving more money to ailing investment banks. With Congress unwilling to give more money to bail the big banks out, these transactions provide another injection of capital into the banks through a third-party -- AIG.

One more quick observation: As Obama delivers noble rhetoric about why torture can't be justified in the name of expediency, his Treasury Department is subverting free markets and the democratic system to save the banking sector. I'm not drawing a moral equivalence, or suggesting that saving the financial system isn't necessary. Call me crazy, but funneling money to i-banks through selling AIG's tax-payer owned assets for cents on the dollar does seem logically analogous to torturing people for the sake of potentially life-saving information; in both cases, you damage our democracy for the sake of expediency. No caterpillars in bank vaults yet, though.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [1]

Who to pay and how much, or CEOs don't earn what they make

This is really the critical point. According to the standard textbook model, an increase (or a decline) in the labour income of a given individual should be interpreted as a rise (or a fall) in his or her marginal product, i.e. his or her contribution to total economic output. That is, if Mr Smith's wage rises from $30,000 to $50,000, then it must be that Mr Smith has produced $20,000 of extra economic output. The beauty of the market system is precisely that the increase in Mr Smith's wage should in principle correspond to the creation of new economic value and well-being, and is not obtained at the expense of anybody else (i.e. even with fully selfish economic agents there is no externality on others that is not being internalised by the price system). This textbook model probably provides an (approximately) accurate description of 99% of the labour market. However it is extremely naïve—to say the least—to imagine that it adequately describes the pay determination process at the very top end of the labour market. Assume that the CEO of AIG or GM manages to get an increase in compensation, say a rise from a $5m to a $10m total annual compensation. It is truly heroic to conclude from this observation that his or her contribution to AIG or GM output has increased by $5m, and that the total output of AIG and GM has risen by that much. There is tremendous evidence showing that the invisible hand of the market simply does not work in this very peculiar segment of the labour market, and that top executives will keep setting their own pay to the highest possible levels (with no connection whatsoever with their marginal product, which nobody can properly estimate) as long as they are not prevented to do so. Historical evidence suggests that highly progressive taxation on very high incomes is the most efficient way to achieve this goal.

This from Professor Thomas Piketty in his Economist debate with Cato Institute's Chris Edwards about instituting high (like 80% marginal tax rates) on incomes over a couple million dollars. It's a good summation of the back and forth that's been happening among policy wonks over how to regulate executive pay.

In this paragraph, Piketty puts his finger on the central perceived problem with paying CEOs a lot of money -- they don't produce value equal to what they earn. But what I haven't seen anywhere is much discussion of the reasons for setting salaries beyond a worker's marginal product, and there are a lot of other reasons.

Most relevant for CEO pay is the way someone else's pay -- someone above me in the corporate hierarchy -- can affect how hard I work. When I am making a decision about how much effort to expend in the current period, I'm balancing the cost of my effort against the benefit I get not only from my current salary, but also from the improved probability of being promoted, and the concomitant salary boost. So if I'm an Executive Vice President at a Fortune 500 company competing with five other EVPs and innumerable outside candidates to become the next CEO of the company, the CEO pay package could incentivize me to work harder to win that promotion. Without that incentive, you may have to pay me more. Paying me and my five other competitors more may actually cost you more than what you saved by paying the CEO less. And it's not that you're paying the CEO for her work -- some of her pay is just to incentivize me.

Obviously, this effect may not explain all big CEO pay packages, but it's at least worth thinking about, because if you don't, you're really not thinking about the problem in a complete way, and could end up misclassifying good corporate policy as bad, or criminal.

To me, big CEO pay packages are not a root problem, but a symptom of weak corporate governance. If we could be reasonably certain that a company's board was truly independent and their CEO was still making a ton of money -- more than they earn themselves -- then we could be reasonably confident that the company had other good reasons, like providing incentives to others within the organization.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

Goldman Sachs thinks we're stupid

6:50 a.m.| Where’s December?: Goldman Sachs reported a profit of $1.8 billion in the first quarter, and plans to sell $5 billion in stock and get out of the government’s clutches, if it can.

How did it do that? One way was to hide a lot of losses in not-so-plain sight.

Goldman’s 2008 fiscal year ended Nov. 30. This year the company is switching to a calendar year. The leaves December as an orphan month, one that will be largely ignored. In Goldman’s earnings statement, and in most of the news reports, the quarter ended March 31 is compared to the quarter last year that ended in February.

The orphan month featured — surprise — lots of write-offs. The pretax loss was $1.3 billion, and the after-tax loss was $780 million.

Would the firm have had a profit if it had stuck to its old calendar, and had to include December and exclude March?

How to run a profitable financial institution in five easy steps.

1. Shift the fiscal year so that it excludes a bad month (December) and includes a better one (March).
2. Stick all your write-offs in the bad month.
3. Report a big quarterly profit.
4. Sell $5 billion of stock to the suckers who believe you.
5. Pay back the government so you can give yourself that big bonus you deserve.

Lloyd Blankfein, everybody. It's also worth noting that Goldman Sachs has set aside $4.8 billion for salary and bonuses -- a larger percentage of revenue than it set aside last year. Also a number suggestively similar in size to the $5 billion in stock they want to sell.

I hope to God this doesn't work out for them.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

I share this problem

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

Why shouldn't I buy one of these?

Pogoplug review

by Joshua Topolsky, posted Apr 6th 2009 at 12:27PM


When we first caught wind of the Pogoplug -- a small box that essentially lets you turn any USB hard drive (and drives only) into a network device -- we were pretty darn excited. Having a house full of disparate storage boxes and no easy way to connect to them made the prospect of the 'plug seem very enticing. Not only does the Pogoplug make your drive accessible via your PC (with accompanying software), but it -- we think more importantly -- makes the drive accessible via a web front-end and an iPhone app. We finally had a chance to break one of these out and see how it performs, and our findings are below.

Sounds pretty sweet. And I don't use my external HD at all as it stands.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

Pussycat Dolls are terrible role models

I would not recommend anyone ride a motorcycle without a headlight or helmet.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]

I am not as fun as I think I am

While procrastinating by using my monthly emusic downloads today, I realized that I really don't understand my own music consumption very well. Or at least my purchasing decisions do not match my consumption habits. Here is a chart detailing the degree to which I over/underweigh my music purchasing by type of consumption:

I know I listen to music a lot while studying and working. So I download a lot of jazz, electronica (i.e. Boards of Canada), and indie music where vocals are fuzzy (i.e. Sea and Cake, Beach House). But I also download music because I would love to listen to it at a party. But I host 0 parties. And I'm still waiting for that first invitation to DJ a party. 


Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [1]

Must read from Nate Silver on GM

GM's Problems are 50 Years in the Making

by Nate Silver @ 7:45 AM

Let's take something of a 30,000-foot view on the condition of General Motors. The chart below details GM's operating margin -- its profits divided into its revenues -- over the past 50 years:



I haven't provided the dates on the chart because they aren't important. The auto business is highly cyclical because consumers are buying expensive assets that last for years at a time. Nobody ever really has to buy a new car (they can buy a used one if their car breaks down), and therefore consumers are willing to hold on to their existing vehicles and wait out economic slumps. You can't do that with, say, a loaf of bread, or even something like a cellphone, which has a much shorter lifespan.



But you knew all of that already. The remarkable thing is that, once you account for the economic cycles, the trend for GM is exceptionally steady -- an exceptionally steady trend downward. There were still bad times thirty years ago -- but they weren't bad enough to threaten GM's survival, and conversely, the good times were much better. These are General Motors' operating margins by decade:
Average Annual Operating Margin, General Motors
1960s: 8.7%
1970s: 5.5%
1980s: 3.0%
1990s: 1.3%*
2000s: -0.5%
* Excludes one-time $20 billion accounting charge for retiree health benefits in 1992.
If I were an alien beaming down from Rigel-3 looking at this pattern -- an alien with an MBA degree -- my first guess is that it would reflect some sort of systemic problem, some chronic imbalance that magnified over time. Something, in other words, like the costs of GM's retiree pension and health care programs. It's difficult to get a precise figure on these so-called legacy costs, but they averaged about $7 billion per year between 1993 and 2007 and are probably at least $10 billion per year now. Considering that GM has never made as much as $10 billion in profit in a year and that its entire operating lossses in 2008 were $13.8 billion, you can see why this is a significant problem.

Of course, GM benefited by promising its employees access to lucrative retirement programs -- it benefited by being able to pay less to those employees in the form of salary. But whereas the benefits to GM came long ago, the costs come now. This, indeed, is the entire crux of the problem, as is cogently explained by this Washington Post article from 2005:

GM began its slide down the slippery slope in 1950, when it began picking up costs for medical insurance, pensions and retiree benefits. There was huge risk to GM in taking on these obligations -- but that didn't show up as a cost or balance-sheet liability. By 1973, the UAW says, GM was paying the entire health insurance bill for its employees, survivors and retirees, and had agreed to "30 and out" early retirement that granted workers full pensions after 30 years on the job, regardless of age.

These problems began to surface about 15 years ago because regulators changed the accounting rules. In 1992, GM says, it took a $20 billion non-cash charge to recognize pension obligations. Evolving rules then put OPEB on the balance sheet. Now, these obligations -- call it a combined $170 billion for U.S. operations -- are fully visible. And out-of-pocket costs for health care are eating GM alive.

GM was willing to cut its employees some very attractive deals in the 1950s through the 1980s -- provided that they took them in the form of retirement benefits rather than salary, which wouldn't hit GM's books until much later and which until 1992 weren't even required to be carried on its balance sheets all, making its financial statements (superficially) more appealing to its shareholders. That health care costs have risen so substantially in the United States have made a bad matter worse.

This issue is wrongly portrayed by both the liberal and the conservative media as one of management versus labor, when really it is a battle between General Motors past and General Motors present. In the 50s, 60s and 70s, everyone benefited: GM and its shareholders got the benefit of higher profit margins, and meanwhile, its employees benefited from GM's willingness to cut a bad deal -- for every dollar they were giving up in salary, those employees were getting a dollar and change back in retirement benefits. But now, everyone is hurting.

Nor does this provide for much in the way of solutions. The retirees might have benefited from GM's short-sightedness -- but they also worked hard Monday through Friday every week of in expectation of receiving the benefits that GM had promised them. From the standpoint of fairness, it would be much better to require GM to take the hit -- but there isn't much of GM left to punish, as its outstanding retiree obligations exceed its market capitalization many times over, and as the decision-makers who led GM into this position left the company decades ago. Today's employees at GM, and the unions that organize them, likewise don't have anything much to do with the problem -- most of the excess costs it requires to produce a Buick versus a Toyota come in the form of legacy costs, not what those employees are receiving in salary and benefits today. And the taxpayer is bound to to get screwed either way, either picking up the tab to bail out GM, or bearing the costs of the pension programs, which are guaranteed by the government (although the legacy health benefits aren't guaranteed).

Policy-makers, finally, share in the blame too. General Motors might be the latest casualty of the distorted incentives created by our employer-based health care system. Meanwhile, the government would probably improve incentives by providing a more generous Social Security guarantee in lieu of guaranteeing private pension programs. The whole idea of Social Security is that people do an inadequate job of saving when left to their own devices. But companies, even companies as big and proud as General Motors, are overly concerned with the present as well.

Dynamics like these have played out in miniature in the past few years, with GM and other domestic automakers borrowing future sales by offering extremely attractive financing and low prices in order to meet their present debt, pension and health care obligations. At some point, "the future" was bound to become "the present." These behaviors are exactly what rational markets are supposed to prevent. GM shouldn't have been able to fool rational investors by shifting labor costs to the future (by shifting payments from salaries to pensions) and revenues to the present (by borrowing future sales). But GM was trading at $40 a share in 2007, whereas it's worth $2 a share now -- a price much closer to the true value of a company involved in these shenanigans. Further evidence that equity market rationality is a myth.

Loading mentions Retweet

Comments [0]